Shared Intel DCAP/QVL verifier with full 64-byte nonce freshness, followed by the published Prem production-invariant appraisal; measurements are compared to an explicitly unpinned baseline.
Attested E2EEStorefront · Workload operator · TEE platform
Compare the protection boundary, the evidence available to your client, and the model you actually need. The examples below are provider-described architectures, not current verified verdicts from this directory.
Confidential inference
Tinfoil describes a confidential VM that runs the inference workload and terminates TLS inside the enclave. Its client verifier compares the TLS public key with the attested key before exchanging application data. [1]
For provider selection, ask where plaintext is available and which components sit outside that boundary. Inspect the Tinfoil provider record, then compare its models and prices.
Attested inference
Privatemode documents collecting hardware-signed evidence, checking it against expected reference values, and releasing trust only on a match. It distinguishes attestation from the later steps that establish the encrypted request path. [2]
Use the attestation monitor to inspect the directory's dated checks and incomplete evidence. A provider's architecture description is not proof that a particular inference request followed a verified route.
TEE inference
For GPU workloads, Tinfoil documents GPU verification during the confidential VM's boot process. Privatemode separately describes worker admission and GPU verification before GPU access is enabled. [1][2]
Compare CPU and GPU coverage separately; do not infer accelerator protection from a CPU enclave label alone. The Privatemode provider record separates documented capabilities from the directory's observed evidence.
Private inference providers
The documented request paths differ: Tinfoil describes attested TLS key binding and encrypted HTTP bodies, while Privatemode describes client-side prompt encryption and key release to attested workers. [1][2]
Shortlist providers by available models, billing units, client integration requirements, and the evidence for the chosen request path—not by the word “private” alone. Start with the provider comparison above and compare the same model across providers.
These providers make relevant confidential-inference claims, but do not currently expose enough working, public evidence to join the model and pricing comparison above.
The documentation advertises confidential inference, but the authenticated catalog returned 28 active models and 0 with attestation enabled. Every model also had an empty attestation endpoint.
Required for comparison
At least one priced model must return fresh, independently verifiable hardware evidence from the documented private inference route.
Maple requires a paid subscription before the live model catalog and API can be accessed. Without an account, current models and prices cannot be independently refreshed from an official endpoint.
Required for comparison
Maple must expose a public model and pricing source, or the directory needs a working subscription that can query the live catalog.