Zero-Trust Attestation
TEE
Verification
Independent cryptographic verification of hardware attestation evidence from confidential inference providers. Raw quotes are parsed and verified against vendor roots of trust — no server-side claims are trusted.
Chutes
4/12Maple
1/1NanoGPT
17+6/28NEAR AI
8/8PPQ.AI
5+1/6Privatemode
6/6Redpill
4+9/23Tinfoil
8+1/9Venice.ai
6+8/14Shared Infrastructure
These providers share the same physical TEE infrastructure:
Verification Methodology
Tinfoil Enclaves
Fetches .well-known/tinfoil-attestation from each enclave. The response contains a gzipped, base64-encoded hardware quote. For TDX enclaves, the quote is verified through Intel DCAP Quote Verification Library (dcap-qvl) using Intel PCS collateral (override via PCCS_URL if needed). For SNP enclaves, the report is verified against AMD KDS VCEK certificates with builtin ARK/ASK roots. TLS certificate SPKI fingerprints are compared to the attested report_data.
Venice.ai / Redpill / NEAR AI (dstack)
All three providers use the same dstack attestation format. Venice returns a direct attestation; Redpill and NEAR AI return a two-layer format (gateway + model attestations). In all cases, the raw intel_quote hex is parsed as a TDX quote and verified via dcap-qvl using Intel PCS collateral (or PCCS_URL override). The quote-bound tcb_info.app_compose hash is recomputed and compared to tcb_info.compose_hash; when compose-manager actions_hash evidence is present, that is recomputed too. Provider server_verification and verified fields are completely ignored.
NVIDIA GPU Attestation
GPU evidence payloads are submitted to NVIDIA's NRAS (NVRemote Attestation Service) which returns a signed JWT. The JWT signature is verified against NRAS's JWKS, the issuer is pinned to nras.attestation.nvidia.com, and the eat_nonce is checked against the request nonce. NRAS currently rejects dstack/Phala GPU evidence (unsupported architecture), so GPU verification is reported separately from TDX.
Chutes / Maple / Privatemode / Other Providers
Chutes is verified by fetching a live TEE chute's evidence endpoint, verifying the Intel TDX quote with dcap-qvl, and checking that report_data binds the verifier nonce plus the ML-KEM E2E public key. Maple is verified only when its AWS Nitro attestation document passes certificate-chain, COSE signature, nonce, and public-key checks. Privatemode is verified through the local Privatemode proxy path; its public Contrast manifest alone is reference material. PPQ is not counted as verified from liveness alone.